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ALL YOUR IP ARE BELONG TO US:
AN ANALYSIS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS AS APPLIED TO MALWARE
By: Miranda Rodriguez*
ABSTRACT
The cybersecurity and cybercrime industries are tied together in an arms
race where both seek out new security vulnerabilities to exploit on offense or
to remediate on defense. Malware (malicious software) offers one of the pri-
mary weapons pioneering new computer technologies on both sides. However,
the average Internet user sees malware at best as an annoyance that is merely
the price of surfing the web.
It is clear that cybersecurity is a business and a successful one. The cyber-
security industry maintains copyrights and patents on our cyber defense tech-
nologies—antivirus software, firewalls, intrusion prevention systems, and
more. There are no federal copyrights and patents on malware, even regarding
the cybersecurity industry’s creations. From an intellectual property perspec-
tive, there is no difference between ordinary software and malicious software.
Malware, as offensive software, can and should be protected, just as we protect
our defensive software.
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I. INTRODUCTION: JUST A BIT OF MALWARE
Malicious software (“malware”) is the bane of any Internet user’s
daily experience. Entire industries have been born just to combat the
spread of malware ever since Creeper, the first documented specimen,
appeared in the 1970s. Creeper, though widely accepted as the first
computer virus, was not a malicious creation.1 In 1971, Bob Thomas of
BBN Technologies deployed Creeper onto the precursor to the In-
ternet—the Advanced Research Projects Agency Network
(“ARPANET”)—as an experiment in mobile code.2 Creeper would
move to a system connected to ARPANET, print “I’M THE
CREEPER : CATCH ME IF YOU CAN,” and then move to the next
system.3 Later, Thomas’s partner, Ray Tomlinson, wrote a companion
program, Reaper, designed to replicate itself on systems connected to
ARPANET in order to find and remove Thomas’s Creeper.4 These
two features, mobility and self-replication, would later become the
primary indicia of a computer virus.5
It is important to note that Creeper and Reaper were not created
maliciously. These were experiments in what was a new field of com-
puting. These processes were something novel and had never been
done before. Since 1971, this type of software has evolved to the
malware we know today—viruses, worms, Trojans, adware, spyware,
rootkits, botnets, and more. In the forty-four years since Creeper and
Reaper, the malware space has pioneered technologies taking advan-
tage of polymorphic encryption, novel ways to use Internet communi-
cation protocols, and manipulation of memory in much the same way
as the more benign areas of Computer Science.
But if you look for patents covering Distributed Denial of Service
(“DDoS,” a common attack vector where an attacker blocks access to
a system by using up the system’s available resources or bandwidth),6
you will not find them. Instead, you will find a multitude of patents
regarding preventing DDoS.7 Neither are there patents for buffer
overflow (another common attack vector where the attacker causes
1. See Richard E. Schantz, BBN’s Network Computing Software Infrastructure
and Distributed Applications (1970–1990), 28 IEEE ANNALS HIST. COMPUTING,
Jan.–Mar. 2006, at 72, 74.
2. See id. at 73–74.
3. First Computer Virus, Creeper, Was No Bug, DISCOVERY NEWS (Mar. 16, 2011,
4:41 PM), http://news.discovery.com/tech/first-computer-virus-creeper-was-no-bug-
110316.htm [http://perma.cc/G79S-3NUS].
4. John F. Shoch & Jon A. Hupp, The “Worm” Programs—Early Experience
With a Distributed Computation, 25 COMM. ACM, Mar. 1982, at 172, 179.
5. See What Is a Computer Virus or a Computer Worm?, KASPERSKY LAB, http://
www.kaspersky.com/internet-security-center/threats/viruses-worms [http://perma.cc/
6TQV-9FSB] [hereinafter What Is a Computer Virus?].
6. Botnets, SHADOW SERVER, https://www.shadowserver.org/wiki/pmwiki.php/In
formation/Botnets (last updated Nov. 2, 2015) [http://perma.cc/PMY3-JG2G].
7. See, e.g., U.S. Patent Nos. 8,359,648 (filed Sept. 1, 2009); 8,634,717 (filed Dec.
8, 2011); 8,886,927 (filed Jan. 14, 2013).
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the system to write outside the bounds of allocated memory to corrupt
data or execute arbitrary commands),8 but there are for preventing it.9
In modern technology, these methods of attack are no longer novel
creations. But when DDoS was first used in 199810 and Buffer Over-
flow in 1988,11 could they have been patented at the time?
Companies who have made their mark securing against malware—
McAfee, Symantec, etc.—hold federally registered copyrights for
their security software.12 The same does not exist for rootkits like
SpyEye, worms like SQL Slammer, or viruses like Melissa.13 But
could there be a common law copyright applied to these malware sam-
ples? Could the authors behind these computer programs federally
register a copyright if they developed these programs in the United
States?
These questions appeared to have been ignored until 2009 when the
ZeuS rootkit was first observed on the Internet and security research-
ers began to analyze the code.14 Much to their surprise, ZeuS had a
rudimentary license agreement in its documentation.15 While it did
not explicitly retain copyright, it provided the following basic tenets
translated into English:
8. Buffer Overflow, THE OPEN WEB APPLICATION SEC. PROJECT, https://www
.owasp.org/index.php/Buffer_Overflow (last updated Sept. 3, 2014) [http://perma.cc/
C832-SCK5].
9. See, e.g., U.S. Patent Nos. 6,301,699 (filed Mar. 18, 1999); 8,443,442 (filed Jan.
30, 2007); 9,069,970 (filed Feb. 13, 2013).
10. Dave Dittrich, DDoS Attack Tool Timeline, USENIX SECURITY SYMPOSIUM
2000, DDOS — IS THERE REALLY A THREAT?, https://staff.washington.edu/dittrich/
talks/sec2000/timeline.html (last updated July 22, 2000) [http://perma.cc/NJ5V-4G4R].
11. Murray Stokely, 3.3 Buffer Overflows, in FREEBSD DEVELOP-
ERS’ HANDBOOK 29, 29 (2014), ftp://ftp.freebsd.org/pub/FreeBSD/doc/en_US.ISO88
59-1/books/developers-handbook/ l (follow “book.pdf.zip”; then, after download,
open “book.pdf” file) [http://perma.cc/6TTR-S3WF].
12. See, e.g., U.S. Copyright Registration Nos. TX0007250609 (registered Apr. 7,
2010) (“McAffee Host Intrusion Prevention 7.0.0”); TX0007703634 (registered June
19, 2012) (“Symantec Endpoint Protection 12.1”).
13. These are three examples of infamous malware. SpyEye is part of the growing
ZeuS family of rootkits and will be discussed in more detail in Part II, infra. First seen
in 2002, SQL Slammer exploited a buffer overflow vulnerability in MS SQL Server
2000 giving an attacker remote access to the host machine. See Edward Ray, Malware
FAQ: MS-SQL Slammer, SANS INSTITUTE, http://www.sans.org/security-resources/
malwarefaq/ms-sql-exploit.php [http://perma.cc/7LZQ-YXS9]. First seen in 1999, the
relatively benign Melissa virus spread at an alarming rate because it would send cop-
ies of itself for the first fifty Outlook contacts of the compromised user. Stephen
Northcutt, Intrusion Detection FAQ: What Was the Melissa Virus and What Can We
Learn From it?, SANS INSTITUTE, https://www.sans.org/security-resources/idfaq/what
_melissa_teaches_us.php [http://perma.cc/2JSP-LPL9].
14. Andrew Hendry, Non-Tech Criminals Can Now Rent-a-Botnet, COM-
PUTERWORLD (May 15, 2008, 10:37 AM), http://www.computerworld.com.au/article/
216322/non-tech_criminals_can_now_rent-a-botnet/.
15. Joel Hruska, Malware Authors Turn to EULAs to Protect Their Work, ARS
TECHNICA (Apr. 28, 2008, 5:40 PM), http://arstechnica.com/security/2008/04/malware-
authors-turn-to-eulas-to-protect-their-work/ [http://perma.cc/BD89-S4HL].
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• The user may not distribute the product in a commercial way.
• The user may not reverse-engineer the bot builder.
• The user may not use the control panel to control other botnets.
• The user may not deliberately share any portion of the code to
anti-virus companies.
• The user must pay for any future features or improvements.16
Some writers quickly dismissed the agreement as absurd and bi-
zarre.17 One user on the popular technology news-source “Slashdot”
joked, “While it seems silly to imagine Zeus’s authors going to the
authorities for violations of this EULA, . . . they probably have an
extra-judicial means of contract enforcement named Ivan.”18 The
opinions were perfectly valid, considering that long-established con-
tracts case law tells us that a contract that arises from an illegal act is
not enforceable.19
The agreement was a mere curiosity compared to the more interest-
ing support model and pricing structure for ZeuS20—a signal to secur-
ity researchers that malware was no longer the product of a lone
computer scientist experimenting with a new technology as with
Creeper, but a business unto itself.21 When ZeuS was transferred to
SpyEye, it retained the same licensing agreement and the new owner
added features to prevent users from copying the code.22
But was it so strange for a software author (malicious or otherwise)
to protect his or her invention or creation? This leads to questions
regarding whether malware can actually be subject to traditional intel-
lectual property protections that are afforded to other software devel-
16. Zeus Trojan Family, DELL SONICWALL SECURITY CENTER (May 26, 2009),
https://www.mysonicwall.com/sonicalert/searchresults.aspx?ev=article&id=132 [http://
perma.cc/EU2S-VB26] (providing an English translation of the original Russian
EULA).
17. Yvette Joy Liebesman, When Selling Your Personal Name Mark Extends to
Selling Your Soul, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 21 (2010) (“And in a rather bizarre example of
an illegal, and thus unenforceable, contract, the creators of the Zeus ‘malware’
software program ‘have added an end-user license agreement to their “product,” set-
ting out a bunch of terms controlling how the criminals who buy their products may
use it, and threatening dire technological reprisals for violations.’” (footnote omitted)
(quoting Cory Doctorow, Malware Gets a EULA, BOING BOING, (Apr. 29, 2008, 3:14
AM), http://www.boingboing.net/2008/04/29/malware-gets-a-eula.html [http://perma
.cc/CM6C-PMD6])).
18. Kdawson, EULAs for Malware, SLASHDOT (Apr. 28, 2008, 10:51 PM), http://
entertainment-beta.slashdot.org/story/08/04/29/0057236/eulas-for-malware [http://per
ma.cc/HZF3-P8UG].
19. See Armstrong v. Toler, 24 U.S. 258, 270 (1826).
20. Discussed in more detail in Section II.B, infra.
21. Kevin Stevens & Don Jackson, ZeuS Banking Trojan Report, DELL
SECUREWORKS (Mar. 11, 2010), http://www.secureworks.com/cyber-threat-intelli
gence/threats/zeus/ [http://perma.cc/W996-URSC].
22. Sean Martin, The Making of a Cybercrime Market, CSO (Aug. 11, 2014, 12:56
PM), http://www.csoonline.com/article/2463175/data-protection/the-making-of-a-
cybercrime-market.html [http://perma.cc/NM9B-TYTF].
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opers. This Comment first examines what malware is and the initial
potential barrier to entry: the legality of writing it. The examination
then turns to the ZeuS family of rootkits specifically and its copyright
and patent prospects. Next, the analysis focuses on the public policy
concerns associated with granting or denying intellectual property
protections to malware. Finally, this Comment recommends allowing
traditional intellectual property to apply to malware, regardless of
how it is used.
II. MALWARE IN A NUTSHELL
A. Definitions
Although it has various definitions, malware commonly means
“software designed to interfere with a computer’s normal function-
ing.”23 This can include damaging systems, disrupting functions, steal-
ing data, or otherwise causing some “bad” action.24 But malware is
not just limited to computers. It can also be found on network devices
such as switches and routers, mobile devices such as phones and tab-
lets, and on removable media such as thumb drives and CDs.25 If the
device has the ability to hold data, it can be infected with some form
of malware.
Malware comes in many forms. Viruses are programs that self-repli-
cate and move from computer to computer.26 Trojans masquerade as
other software or files to execute other malware, enable a remote con-
nection, or exploit some other system vulnerability.27 Spyware
monitors how a system is used or takes data off the system to send to a
third party.28 These are just a few of the different forms malicious
software may take. This Comment, however, will focus primarily on
rootkits and botnets.
In his work The Rootkit Arsenal, Bill Blunden sums up rootkits best
as “an uninvited guest that’s surprisingly neat, clean, and difficult to
unearth.”29 To put it technically, however, rootkits are “a set of bina-
ries, scripts, and configuration files (e.g., a kit) that allows someone
covertly to maintain access to a computer so that he can issue com-
23. Malware, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
malware [http://perma.cc/EY4G-8EYR].




26. See What Is a Computer Virus?, supra note 5.
27. What Is a Trojan Virus?, KASPERSKY LAB, http://usa.kaspersky.com/internet-
security-center/threats/trojans [http://perma.cc/L6H5-7WUE].
28. See Types of Spyware, KASPERSKY LAB, http://usa.kaspersky.com/internet-se
curity-center/threats/adware-pornware-riskware [http://perma.cc/CEH3-MBPS].
29. REV. BILL BLUNDEN, THE ROOTKIT ARSENAL: ESCAPE AND EVASION IN THE
DARK CORNERS OF THE SYSTEM 4 (2d ed. 2013).
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mands and scavenge data without alerting the system’s owner.”30
Rootkits are an end-game type of malware used after something else
has already exploited a system and gained access to a target
machine.31
Rootkits are often paired with other malware. For example, the
rootkit might keep a virus hidden or a Trojan might have deployed the
rootkit in the first place.32 The rootkit is also one of the ways that a
botnet is established. Botnets are a collection of computers (hosts
known as “zombies” or “drones”) controlled by a “Command and
Control” server (“C&C”) that work together to accomplish a task for
the botnet owner (“herder”).33 This might be a benign function such
as a university in need of a distributed computing power for a large-
scale data project34 or a nefarious function such as a massive DDoS
attack.35
Though their names are similar, a rootkit is not a malware kit.
Malware kits, also known as exploit kits, are prepackaged exploits
that require little knowledge on the part of the user to leverage
against a target.36 With some malware kits, the user can customize
their malware through configuring a builder in the kit.37 The kits can
include premade landing screens for phishing attempts, executable
programs to use as Trojans, or even a customized rootkit.38 The partic-
ular rootkits this Comment uses as an example, the ZeuS family, are
built using variants of the original ZeuS malware kit.39
B. The ZeuS Family
ZeuS was an infamous rootkit in the late 2000s and early 2010s de-
veloped by Evgeniy Bogchev, known as “Slavik” in the underground
malware market.40 ZeuS was unique because it was marketed as a
30. Id. at 5.
31. Id. at 6–7.
32. See id. at 13–14.
33. Botnets, supra note 6.
34. See BERKELEY OPEN INFRASTRUCTURE FOR NETWORK COMPUTING
(BOINC), http://boinc.berkeley.edu/ [http://perma.cc/63VV-L558] (last modified
Sept. 26, 2015, 6:12 AM) [hereinafter BOINC].
35. BLUNDEN, supra note 29, at 17.
36. Joshua Cannell, Tools of the Trade: Exploit Kits, MALWAREBYTES UNPACKED




39. JAMES WYKE, SOPHOSLABS, WHAT IS ZEUS? 2 (2011), http://www.sophos
.com/en-us/medialibrary/PDFs/technical%20papers/Sophos%20what%20is%20zeus
%20tp.pdf [http://perma.cc/W5FW-XX65].
40. David Gilbert, Gameover for Slavik—The Cybercrime Kingpin Behind the
Zeus Malware: Evgeniy Bogachev Unmasked, INT’L BUS. TIMES (June 3, 2014, 3:21
PM), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/gameover-slavik-cybercrime-kingpin-behind-zeus-mal
ware-1451095 [http://perma.cc/WP99-B9AT].
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malware kit that users could configure to generate their own botnet.41
While the free version had very few features, a fully functioning kit in
2010 could cost about $4,000.42 Depending on what other features
users wanted, they could pay extra for additional modules to add to
their kit.43 For example, a user could obtain a backdoor functionality
through the BackConnect module in order to connect to the infected
computer again for $1,500 or a VPN module for $10,000 to connect
with a Total Presence Proxy and take full control of the infected ma-
chine.44 Just like innocuous software that a less malicious user might
pay for, the licensing of Slavik’s product was controlled using a hard-
ware-based system where a user provided a key generated from the
user’s computer and Slavik would provide a key for that computer in
return in order to run the software.45
ZeuS in its simplest form can be reduced to the builder, the drop-
per, the Zbot binary, and the C&C.46 The builder is the main compo-
nent of the kit and creates the malware that will infect the victim’s
machine and connect back to the C&C.47 In later versions of ZeuS,
the user could also configure the malware to use polymorphic encryp-
tion, which made it significantly harder to detect.48 The malware could
be dropped on the target machine by another Trojan, or it could func-
tion as the dropper itself.49 If acting as the dropper, the malware
would begin to copy itself onto the system.50 If the malware was being
dropped, then it would begin injecting itself into running processes on
the machine.51 The Zbot binary is the core of the malware and is re-
sponsible for the major functions such as copying itself, injecting code,
scraping data, and communicating with the C&C.52 The herder issues
commands to the compromised machines (the bots) via the C&C.53
One of the hallmarks that set ZeuS apart from other malicious
software was how easy it was to use both the configuration elements
41. See WYKE, supra note 39, at 2.
42. Stevens & Jackson, supra note 21.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Brian Krebs, SpyEye vs. ZeuS Rivalry, KREBS ON SECURITY (Apr. 1, 2010),
http://krebsonsecurity.com/2010/04/spyeye-vs-zeus-rivalry/ [http://perma.cc/F7QT-75
RE].
46. WYKE, supra note 39, at 3–7.
47. Id. at 3, 6.
48. Stevens & Jackson, supra note 21.
49. See WYKE, supra note 39, at 7.
50. Id.
51. See id.
52. Id. at 6.
53. Id. at 5.
670 TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW [Vol. 3
in the builder and to set up the C&C.54 In minutes, a user could have a
running C&C to coordinate bots and harvest data.55
In 2010, a “new kit on the block” arrived—Aleksandr Panin, also
known as “Gribodemon,” developed a major competitor to ZeuS
called SpyEye.56 SpyEye also was referred to as the “ZeuS Killer”
because not only did the kit perform with similar functionality for a
similar price, but it would also search a target machine for ZeuS and
eradicate the rootkit.57 Despite Gribodemon’s boasts that SpyEye was
superior to ZeuS, the rivalry between Slavik and Gribodemon died
down in late 2010 and it appeared that Slavik had transferred the
ZeuS code to SpyEye.58 Gribodemon planned to combine the two
malware kits to make an even better rootkit with more modular plug-
in options than ZeuS.59 Just as Slavik had implemented a licensing
scheme and rudimentary license agreement in his software,
Gribodemon threatened that unauthorized copies of the old ZeuS
product had an undocumented backdoor that he would use to add the
user’s machine to his own botnet.60
But just as quickly as the new SpyEye took off, it came crashing
back down with the development of Ice IX.61 Around the same time
that SpyEye began integrating ZeuS to build a bigger, better rootkit,
the ZeuS source code was leaked in underground malware forums and
became fair game to any enterprising malware author.62 Shortly after
the release of the ZeuS code, Ice IX went on the market as a greatly
improved version of ZeuS with greater survivability (a key feature of
a successful rootkit).63 Although the Ice IX user interface was perhaps
not as flashy and pretty as ZeuS and SpyEye, the much lower cost (the
build kit only cost $1,800 compared to ZeuS’s $4,000 pricetag) and the
advanced features were certainly far more appealing.64 Security re-
search firm Damballa began to see previous SpyEye customers switch
54. See Simon Mullis, Cybercriminal Intent: How to Build Your Own Botnet in




56. Krebs, SpyEye vs. ZeuS Rivalry, supra note 45.
57. Id.
58. Brian Krebs, SpyEye v. ZeuS Rivalry Ends in Quiet Merger, KREBS ON SECUR-




61. SEAN BODMER, DAMBALLA, SPYEYE BEING KICKED TO THE CURB BY ITS
CUSTOMERS? 5–6 (2012), https://www.damballa.com/downloads/r_pubs/RN_SpyEye-
Kicked-to-Curb_Bodmer.pdf [http://perma.cc/E7PD-TPPE].
62. Dennis Fisher, ZeuS Source Code Leaked, THREATPOST (May 10, 2011, 2:10
PM), http://threatpost.com/zeus-source-code-leaked-051011/75217 [http://perma.cc/
8LT4-YXD3].
63. BODMER, supra note 61, at 7.
64. See id.
2016] ALL YOUR IP ARE BELONG TO US 671
over to Ice IX soon after its release.65 Even if the leaked source code
meant that more malware authors could make hybrid forms of the old
ZeuS, Ice IX clearly offered something that criminal organizations
were willing to pay for.
C. Malware and its Authors in the Law
Common definitions, forms, and families aside, there is no clear le-
gal prohibition on creating malware. Black’s Law Dictionary provides
a legal definition for malicious technology: “[a]ny electronic or
mechanical means, [especially] software, used to monitor or gain ac-
cess to another’s computer system without authorization for the pur-
pose of impairing or disabling the system.”66 This mostly coincides
with the common meaning discussed earlier—to interfere with the
computer’s normal functioning.67 But where is the definition actually
used?
The key federal statute on point is 18 U.S.C. § 1030, entitled “Fraud
and related activity in connection with computers” (and still com-
monly known as the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”)).
The terms “malicious technology” and “malware” are not used or de-
fined in the CFAA, but what the statute prohibits certainly fits within
malware’s definition: accessing without authorization, intending to de-
fraud, intentionally causing damage, recklessly causing damage, and
extorting money through threat of the aforementioned actions.68 The
statute criminalizes the use of malware by a malicious user who inten-
tionally accesses (or threatens to access) data or systems beyond the
scope of the user’s authorization or intentionally causes damage (or
threatens to cause damage) to that data or system.69 The statute never
mentions writing the software.
Though this particular statute does not specifically target creation
and writing, it has been used against authors of malware, including
cybersecurity researchers70 (the “White Hat” hackers who seek to
identify and remediate a security vulnerability before it is maliciously
exploited),71 cybercriminals72 (the “Black Hat” hackers who mali-
65. Id. at 5.
66. Malicious Technology, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
67. Malware, supra note 23.
68. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012).
69. Id. § 1030(a).
70. Indictment, United States v. Auernheimer, Crim. No. 11-cr-470 (SDW), 2012
WL 5389142 (D.N.J. Oct. 24, 2012), vacated for improper venue, 748 F.3d 525 (3d Cir.
2014) (No. 11-470) [hereinafter Auernheimer Indictment] (charging a cybersecurity
researcher under CFAA).
71. What Is a White Hat?, SECPOINT, https://www.secpoint.com/what-is-a-white-
hat.html [http://perma.cc/3HPB-TMZ4].
72. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice Office of Pub. Affairs, Cyber Criminal
Pleads Guilty to Developing and Distributing Notorious SpyEye Malware (Jan. 28,
2014) [hereinafter Cyber Criminal Pleads Guilty], http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
cyber-criminal-pleads-guilty-developing-and-distributing-notorious-spyeye-malware
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ciously exploit the vulnerability),73 and those who fall somewhere be-
tween the two.74 U.S. law enforcement recently apprehended
cybercriminal and SpyEye author Alexsandr Panin, who pled guilty to
“conspiracy to commit wire and bank fraud for his role as the primary
developer and distributor of the malicious software.”75 Panin, as a
cybercriminal intending to maliciously use SpyEye, is someone you
would expect to be caught by the provisions in the CFAA. However,
security researcher Andrew Auernheimer was also charged with con-
spiracy after he discovered a vulnerability in how AT&T handled iPad
users’ email addresses.76 Auernheimer published his co-authored
proof-of-concept script, Account Slurper, which demonstrated that
vulnerability.77 Auernheimer sought to discover vulnerability and see
it remediated as opposed to Panin who sought to exploit vulnerability.
In both cases, malware created by a cybercriminal and a security re-
searcher were caught by part (b) of the CFAA: “Whoever conspires to
commit or attempts to commit an offense under subsection (a) of this
section shall be punished as provided in subsection (c) of this
section.”78
Auernheimer and Panin are only the latest authors to come under
fire from CFAA. Later in 2014, The Guardian published an article in
which several cybersecurity researchers revealed that they had been
threatened with CFAA action if they continued the research they
were currently performing.79 Most notable was Metasploit author
H.D. Moore, who claimed he had been “warned” that his Internet-
wide scanning project would run afoul of CFAA.80 Despite the
threats, H.D. Moore completed his research and, in the process, un-
covered serious vulnerabilities in Universal Plug and Play.81 The arti-
cle also reported on research that had been abandoned by researcher
Zach Lanier when his research team was threatened with CFAA
before they could disclose a vulnerability in a device marketed to chil-
dren.82 The lack of distinction between a cybercriminal and a cyber-
[http://perma.cc/6XMP-D4NC] (announcing a cybercriminal being charged under
CFAA).
73. What Is a Black Hat?, SECPOINT, https://www.secpoint.com/what-is-a-black-
hat.html [http://perma.cc/RE6B-Y3WX].
74. See, e.g., United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1991) (blurring the line
between cybersecurity researcher and cybercriminal due to the result of the malware).
75. Cyber Criminal Pleads Guilty, supra note 72.
76. Auernheimer Indictment, supra note 70, at ¶¶ 5–7.
77. Id. at ¶¶ 7–10.
78. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(b) (2012).
79. Tom Brewster, US Cybercrime Laws Being Used to Target Security Research-
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security researcher in CFAA causes concern for cybersecurity experts
and leads to a “chilling effect on . . . research.”83
Considering United States v. Auernheimer, the concern is valid. Af-
ter being charged with both conspiracy and identity fraud for Account
Slurper, Aurenheimer was sentenced to forty-one months of imprison-
ment.84 Despite elegant arguments from numerous interest groups,
cybersecurity experts, and professionals, the court bypassed “a num-
ber of complex and novel issues that are of great public importance in
our increasingly interconnected age” and vacated Aurenheimer’s con-
viction on a venue error—leaving questions regarding how to handle
cybersecurity research undecided.85
This is not to say that someone who uses malware to harm or steal
should not be punished accordingly. The point of CFAA is to
criminalize computer fraud, which is often carried out by malware.86
Malware liability should be analogous to firearms liability. Those who
rob a bank with a gun should be punished for robbing the bank with a
deadly weapon. However, under today’s laws, gun manufacturers may
be subject to traditional products liability—but they are not liable for
the crime committed with their product.87
It is hard to separate writing malware from maliciously using the
malware—this is why the CFAA’s conspiracy charge can be so suc-
cessful. Like a gun, whose purpose may be described as “harm,”
malware’s purpose is often to harm a computer system. To simply say
“to harm” in regards to a gun is a gross oversimplification. Harm in-
flicted in self-defense, for example, is treated far differently than mur-
der. The same can be said of malware—what a security researcher
writes is often more of a gray area than what a cybercriminal writes.
Aurenheimer used Account Slurper to prove a vulnerability while
Bogchev and Panin used their rootkits to commit crimes.
Consider the rootkits and botnets to which this Comment applies
intellectual property rights. In The Rootkit Arsenal, Blunden examines
several different scenarios where rootkit technologies are part of “or-
dinary” software.88 Sony’s digital rights management software at one
point hid files, phoned home to Sony (like a bot to a C&C), and traf-
ficked user data such as media player IDs and the user IP addresses.89
83. Id.
84. United States v. Auernheimer, 748 F.3d 525, 532 (3d Cir. 2014).
85. Id. at 532, 535–36.
86. 132 Cong. Rec. 7816 (1986) (“Computer technology has brought us a long way
in the past decade. However, computer technology—with all its gains—has left us
with a new breed of criminal: the technologically sophisticated criminal who breaks
into computerized data files.”); 2014 Data Breach Investigations Report, VERIZON 9
fig.8, http://www.verizonenterprise.com/DBIR/ (follow “Download 2014 DBIR”
hyperlink) (showing malware and hacking trend lines representing the prior ten
years).
87. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 7901–7903 (2012).
88. BLUNDEN, supra note 29, at 19–21.
89. Id. at 20.
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Antivirus vendors have used rootkits to prevent users from deleting or
enumerating software files by injecting custom file system filter driv-
ers.90 Government actors also use the technology in their tools in in-
telligence operations against other nation states.91 Blunden put it
bluntly: “Asking whether rootkits are inherently good or bad is a ri-
diculous question. . . . The fact is that rootkit technology is powerful
and potentially dangerous.”92
Like rootkits, botnets inhabit gray areas. Universities can take ad-
vantage of botnet technology to create large-scale virtual distributed
computer networks such as Berkley’s BOINC service.93 Berkeley pro-
ject servers function similarly to the C&C in the average botnet.94 The
project servers assign tasks to the volunteer “zombie hosts,” who in
turn complete the tasks and send the results back.95 The same type of
technology that divides brute force attacks across the botnet herd can
also assist researchers in the BOINC projects. Volunteer botnets are
not limited to universities. During the height of the WikiLeaks scan-
dal, Anonymous utilized its LOIC botnet software to allow users to
voluntarily contribute their computing power to Anonymous-driven
DDoS protests of major credit card providers.96
CFAA, together with the murky reasons malware authors develop
their software, causes substantial confusion over the legality of writing
malware. It is difficult to clearly conclude whether writing malware is
prohibited. An author or inventor’s ability to protect malware does
not necessarily hinge on the illegality of the device. Courts have found
patents are not void if they are put to illegal purpose, as long as the
device “is normally and naturally adapted to a lawful use.”97 How-
ever, particularly for cybersecurity researchers, being able to merely
write malware without fear of legal action would weigh heavily in the
decision-making process of authors or inventors who consider seeking
intellectual property protections for their creation.
III. MALWARE UNDER COPYRIGHT
Because the ZeuS family of rootkits contains a license agreement,
this Comment will use the original ZeuS rootkit for copyright analysis.
For the purposes of this Section, ZeuS is treated as if it were written in
90. Id.
91. Id. at 23.
92. Id. at 26–27.
93. See, e.g., BOINC, supra note 34.
94. See How BOINC Works, BOINC, http://boinc.berkeley.edu/wiki/How_
BOINC_works [http://perma.cc/C5G9-DQPT] (last updated July 21, 2013, 3:43 AM).
95. See id.
96. Elinor Mills, WikiLeaks Fans Should Think Before They Botnet, CNET (Dec.
10, 2010, 3:01 PM), http://www.cnet.com/news/wikileaks-fans-should-think-before-
they-botnet/ [http://perma.cc/5M6H-SYCD].
97. Koppe v. Burnstingle, 29 F.2d 923, 925 (D.R.I. 1929).
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the U.S., as international copyright concerns are not in scope of this
Comment.
A. Ordinary Software’s Qualifications for Copyright
In 1980, Congress amended Title 17 of the United States Code per-
taining to copyrights to reflect changes in technology and to extend
copyright protection to that technology.98 At its heart, copyright still
requires an “original work[ ] of authorship fixed in [a] tangible me-
dium of expression” that can be perceived in some way, directly or
with a machine.99 Congress’ amended language added a definition for
computer programs: “a set of statements or instructions to be used
directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain
result.”100 The test of this language arose in 1983 in Apple Computer,
Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp. when Apple sought to enjoin Frank-
lin Computer from further alleged infringement of fourteen of Ap-
ple’s computer programs.101 The district court had originally denied
the motion to preliminarily enjoin because the court doubted that the
object code Apple sought to protect was copyrightable.102 The Third
Circuit Court of Appeals examined copyright protections for com-
puter programs to determine whether there was any difference in how
the program appeared to the human reader.103
The appellate court in Apple looked to the statute and stated that
“copyright extends to works in any tangible means of expression ‘from
which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated,
either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.’”104 The court
then applied this to the statutory definition of a computer program,
concluding that a computer program in its various forms (source code
readable by a human or object code readable by a computer) may be
perceived either directly or with the aid of a machine and accom-
plishes its tasks through a set of instructions either directly or indi-
rectly via the computer.105
Also at issue in Apple was whether programs that were part of an
operating system were distinguishable.106 Franklin Computer argued
the programs that were part of the operating system should be ex-
cluded from protection because 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) excludes “proce-
98. Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Copyright Protection of Computer Pro-
grams, 180 A.L.R. Fed. 1, § 2[a] (2002) (discussing the findings of the Commission On
New Technological Uses of Copyright Works regarding computer programs).
99. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).
100. Id. § 101.
101. Apple Comput., Inc. v. Franklin Comput. Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1242 (3d Cir.
1983).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1246–47.
104. Id. at 1248 (quoting § 102(a) (emphasis omitted)).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1249.
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dure[s], process[es], . . . [or] method[s] of operation” from
copyright.107 The appellate court countered that, whether the program
told the computer “to help prepare an income tax return . . . or to
translate a high level language program from source code into its bi-
nary language object code form,” it was still the same set of instruc-
tions that had been expressly referenced in the amended statute.108 As
a result, the copyright analysis for computer programs turns on
whether the program includes an original, authored set of instructions
fixed in a tangible medium that can be perceived in some way, either
directly or with the aid of the computer.
Apple also discussed the limit on computer program copyrights: the
idea/expression dichotomy.109 Idea/expression was not a new concept
just for computer programs. In 1930, the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals grappled with the dichotomy in deciding an infringement suit in
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp.110 In Nichols, playwright Anne
Nichols had sued Universal Pictures after the company produced a
movie with a similar theme as her “Abie’s Irish Rose.”111 Both pro-
ductions featured a Jewish family and an Irish family whose children
fell in love with each other despite the strict religious natures of both
families.112 While certainly Anne Nichols’s play had a valid copyright
for “Abie’s Irish Rose,” the court found that her copyright did not
extend to “everything that might be drawn from her play.”113 The
court further explained that “[a] comedy based upon conflicts be-
tween Irish and Jews, into which the marriage of their children enters,
is no more susceptible of copyright than the outline of Romeo and
Juliet.”114
While Nichols helped define the idea/expression dichotomy, the
court conceded that the line between an idea and its expression may
seem arbitrary;115 the court in Apple helped draw the line a little
clearer with respect to computer programs. The Apple court sought to
preserve a balance between competition and protection—in this case,
balancing protection of Apple Computer’s operating system programs
with fostering competition with Franklin Computer by allowing them
to develop similar programs.116 The court focused the idea/expression
dichotomy inquiry on whether an idea is capable of various modes of
expression.117 If other programs could perform the same function as
107. Id. at 1250; § 102(b).
108. Apple, 714 F.2d at 1251.
109. Id. at 1252–54.
110. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 119–20 (2d Cir. 1930).
111. Id. at 120.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 122.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Apple Comput., Inc. v. Franklin Comput. Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1253 (3d Cir.
1983).
117. Id.
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Apple’s, then those programs were all expressions of the idea and
copyrightable. However, if there is only one way to do something—an
idea which can only be expressed one way—then idea and expression
have merged and the program is no longer copyrightable.118
Apple’s idea/expression dichotomy and merger is not the only test
for copyrightability. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals developed
the abstraction-filtration-comparison test in Computer Associates In-
ternational, Inc. v. Altai, Inc. to help determine if a work has been
infringed.119 In Altai, the court used the lessons learned in Nichols to
abstract the ideas in the computer program from the expressive ele-
ments.120 In the first step, abstraction, the court begins at the code
level (the individual instructions protected by statute) and abstracts
up, layer by layer, to identify the program’s ultimate functions.121
Once the court has identified levels of abstraction, the next step is to
filter out which pieces are ideas and which are expressions.122 The fil-
tration step is designed to filter out uncopyrightable material such as
ideas, elements dictated by efficiency, elements dictated by external
factors, and elements taken from the public domain.123 The last step,
comparison, uses what remains after filtration to compare the protect-
able expressions to the potential offending program.124
B. Ordinary Software’s Rights & Limitations Under
a Federally Registered Copyright
The Copyright Act defines the statutory rights provided to feder-
ally-registered copyright holders. Section 106(1)–(3) grants the follow-
ing key rights for computer software: to reproduce, to prepare
derivative works, and to distribute copies by sale, transfer, rental,
lease, or lending.125 These rights are subject to limitations,126 specifi-
cally under § 107 “Limitations on exclusive rights: Fair Use” and § 117
“Limitations on exclusive rights: Computer Programs.”127 Section 117
largely focuses on when a user can make copies of the software, such
as when it is necessary to run the software or is required to perform
maintenance of the host machine.128 In malware’s case, fair use is the
more likely defense to copyright prohibitions.
Because idea and expression are so intertwined in software, fair use
of the copyrighted materials can extend even to disassembly and
118. Id.
119. Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 706–12 (2d Cir. 1992).
120. Id. at 706–07.
121. Id. at 707.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 710.
125. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1)–(3) (2012).
126. See id. §§ 107–122.
127. Id. §§ 107, 117.
128. Id. § 117.
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decompiling (a process of reverse engineering by transforming ma-
chine-readable code to human-readable code).129 In Sony Computer
Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., Sony alleged that Connectix
had infringed Sony’s copyright when Connectix reverse engineered
the Sony Playstation BIOS in order to make a video game console
emulator.130 Connectix’s reverse engineering included disassembling
discrete portions of the Sony BIOS and observing the Sony BIOS as it
functioned.131 The Connectix developers would copy the Sony BIOS
into RAM and watch how it interacted with their hardware emulator
through use of a debugging program.132 The court relied on Sega En-
terprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc. to first establish that disassembly was
not a prohibited means of fair use: “Where disassembly is the only
way to gain access to the ideas and functional elements embodied in a
copyrighted computer program and where there is a legitimate reason
for seeking such access, disassembly is a fair use of copyrighted work,
as a matter of law.”133 Once the court determined disassembly was
acceptable, it analyzed the case under the four statutory factors of fair
use: (1) purpose and character of the use, (2) nature of the copy-
righted work, (3) amount and substantiality of the portion used, and
(4) effect of the use upon the potential market.134
The first factor, purpose and character of use, focuses on “to what
extent the new work is transformative.”135 The court found that Con-
nectix’s product was not merely a change in form (substituting Sony’s
product with theirs), but rather “indirect or derivative.”136 The court
recognized that Connectix’s purpose in reverse engineering the BIOS
was to make a product that would be compatible with Sony.137 The
second factor, nature of the copyrighted work, looks at what degree of
protection the allegedly infringed work requires.138 The court reiter-
ated its stance from Sega that some works are at a distance from the
core of copyright protection—a work whose underlying ideas cannot
be accessed without copying portions of it is unprotected.139 Accord-
ingly, the court concluded that the Sony BIOS “lies at a distance from
the core because it contains unprotected aspects that cannot be ex-
amined without copying.”140 The third factor, amount and substantial-
129. See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1514, 1520 (9th Cir.
1992).
130. Sony Comput. Entm’t, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 598–99 (9th Cir.
2000).
131. Id. at 601.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 602 (emphasis omitted).
134. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
135. Sony, 203 F.3d at 606.
136. Id. at 607.
137. Id.
138. See id. at 603.
139. Id. at 603–06.
140. Id. at 603.
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ity of the portion used, examines how much of the original work is
used in relation to the original work as a whole.141 To develop its
product, Connectix both disassembled and copied Sony’s product mul-
tiple times.142 While in some cases this would weigh heavily against
the alleged infringer, it did not against Connectix.143 The court de-
cided that this factor carried little weight because Connectix’s product
did not itself contain infringing material from Sony’s.144 The final fac-
tor, effect of the use upon the potential market, analyzes what impact
the alleged infringer’s work has on the original work’s market.145 This
factor does not seek to protect monopolies.146 In fact, earlier in the
opinion, the court instructed Sony, saying: “If Sony wishes to obtain a
lawful monopoly on the functional concepts in its software, it must
satisfy the more stringent standards of the patent laws.”147 The court
reasoned that Connectix was a competitor and that Sony would see
some economic loss due to the competition—but this was not so nega-
tive an impact that it would prohibit Connectix’s from using the Sony
BIOS.148 Weighing the four factors, the Court found that Connectix’s
use of the Sony BIOS was indeed fair use.149
C. Copyright Rule Application to the ZeuS Family
What does this mean, if anything, for ZeuS? The ZeuS rootkit, as
software, falls under statutorily defined copyrightable subject mat-
ter.150 The question is whether it can pass the idea/expression test. The
underlying idea behind rootkits (and ZeuS is no different) seems to be
subverting detection through anti-forensics.151 Blunden offered sev-
eral ways this could be accomplished (or expressed): data destruction,
data concealment, data transformation, data fabrication, and data
source elimination.152 Moreover, these methods can all be expressed
in different ways. For example, ZeuS expressed these ideas by using
polymorphic encryption to conceal and transform, as well as by hiding
components in registry keys to hide stolen data.153
Meanwhile, the idea behind the botnet is to wield the computing
power of bots to accomplish the herder’s tasks. Botnets are common
and there does not seem to be a multitude of ways to express this idea
141. Id. at 605–06.
142. Id. at 606.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 607.
146. Id. at 607–08.
147. Id. at 605.
148. Id. at 607.
149. Id. at 608.
150. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012); see also H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 51, reprinted in 1976
U.S.S.C.A.N. 5664.
151. See BLUNDEN, supra note 29, at 13, 35.
152. Id. at 46.
153. Stevens & Jackson, supra note 42.
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in software. Berkeley’s BOINC and Anonymous’ LOIC accomplish
the idea in similar ways—a C&C assigns small, individual tasks to bots
and collects the results.154 Botnets seem to fit better with the abstrac-
tion model of copyrightability of software. Botnets require abstracting
ideas out to their expression and filtering out the pieces that are in the
public domain or are required for the botnet to function.
ZeuS and its family of software combined the botnet with the root-
kit.155 ZeuS has copyrightable elements and non-copyrightable ele-
ments—the rootkit in its multiple expressions likely qualifies but
perhaps not the botnet if its expression has merged with the idea.
ZeuS could be copyrighted and, if writing malware was clearly legal,
its licensing model enforced. The Ice IXs of the malware world could
be considered ZeuS infringers, depending on how much of them was
actually based on the leaked version of ZeuS. With a valid copyright,
ZeuS would have to show that Ice IX had access to ZeuS’s copy-
righted material and that there was substantial similarity between the
copyrighted work and the alleged infringing work.156
Before merging with ZeuS, SpyEye may have been an infringer de-
pending on how Gribodemon developed his “ZeuS Killer.” Like Con-
nectix, SpyEye pre-merger was a competitor.157 Unlike Connectix
though, SpyEye was not trying to simply play in the same space—it
sought out ZeuS installations on a victim machine and then removed
it.158 The nature and use factor as well as the market impact may
weigh heavily against SpyEye. Cybersecurity researchers, who reverse
engineer malware as a means to protect users from harm, could be
seen under a fair use light. Like SpyEye, Cybersecurity researchers
would likely be seeking to impact the malware market by completely
removing the rootkit. But like Connectix, researchers could also be
viewed as competitors discovering how something works and expres-
sing the idea in their own way. That is how remediation of vulnerabili-
ties is discovered. Cybersecurity researchers would analyze the
underlying idea to build better more secure products. Protecting users
from harm should fall under the existing fair use factors as the re-
searchers put the malware work to a completely different use.
154. How BOINC Works, supra note 94; see also Deepanker Verma, LOIC (Low
Orbit Ion Cannon)—DOS Attacking Tool, INFOSEC INST. (Dec. 20, 2011), http://re
sources.infosecinstitute.com/loic-dos-attacking-tool/ [http://perma.cc/FR85-FEKU].
155. Hamid Binsalleeh et al., On the Analysis of the Zeus Botnet Crimeware Tool-
kit, in 2010 8TH INT’L CONF. PRIVACY, SEC., & TRUST 31, 32 (2010), http://www
.qcwireless.net/pst_paper_2010/papers/p31-binsalleeh.pdf [http://perma.cc/F3DN-
EEHK].
156. N. Coast Indus. v. Jason Maxwell, Inc., 972 F.2d 1031, 1033–34 (9th Cir. 1992).
157. See Krebs, SpyEye vs. ZeuS Rivalry, supra note 45.
158. Id.
2016] ALL YOUR IP ARE BELONG TO US 681
IV. MALWARE UNDER PATENT
Similar to the copyright analysis in Part III, this Part will focus on
the ZeuS family of rootkits for patent analysis. For the purposes of the
analysis, this Part treats ZeuS as if it were written in the U.S., as inter-
national patent concerns are outside the scope of this Comment.
A. Ordinary Software’s Qualifications for Patent Post-Alice
Patents cover inventions of processes, machines, manufactures, or
compositions that are novel and non-obvious to a person with ordi-
nary skill in the invention’s particular field.159 Software in particular
can be tricky to patent especially after the recent Supreme Court deci-
sion in Alice Corp. Proprietary Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l.
In Alice, the court grappled with how to handle abstract ideas
presented in computer software.160 Similar to copyrights, patent pro-
tection does not extend to abstract ideas—the analysis requires a
court to separate the abstract from the expression.161 Accordingly, the
court in Alice employed an abstraction test for patents that resembles
the copyright abstraction test. First, it examines the claim to deter-
mine if it is describing the abstract idea. Second, it examines the indi-
vidual elements of the claim alone and in combination to uncover an
inventive concept which could transform the nature of the claim into
an eligible patentable subject matter.162
The claims at issue in Alice concerned using a computer to mitigate
settlement risk in financial exchanges, and in previous cases the Court
held this type of financial data handling was an abstract idea.163 What
remained was to determine whether there was something in the claim
which could transform it by “includ[ing] ‘additional features’ to ensure
‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize
the [abstract idea].’”164 The Court found that simply implementing the
idea via a computer was no longer enough to transform an abstract
idea into patentable subject matter.165 Because computers are so ubiq-
uitous, implementation via a computer was reduced down to a con-
ventional element and a means of monopolizing an idea.166 Instead,
the claim needs to show that it makes some improvement over the
existing process and cannot be simply a means of organizing human
activity—it needs to offer something “more.”167
159. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103 (2012).
160. Alice Corp. Pty., Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2351–60 (2014).
161. Id. at 2354.
162. Id. at 2355.
163. Id. at 2352, 2357.
164. Id. (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct.
1289, 1297 (2012)).
165. Id. at 2358.
166. Id. at 2357.
167. Id.
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In a memorandum to patent examiners, the United States Patent
and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) further clarified the standard.168
The USPTO was careful to say that the Alice decision did not create
new standards for software but that it expanded the abstract idea test
to computer-implemented claims.169 Software, however, is a com-
puter-implemented process; that means software needs to go beyond
merely organizing human activity.170 While some in the patent field
feared this was the death knell for software patents, cases since Alice
have further defined how software can distinguish itself from an ab-
stract idea.171
Of these cases examining software patenting, DDR Holdings, LLC
v. Hotels.com, LP, is notable as it finally finds a piece of software
patentable.172 DDR Holdings was the assignee of two patents that de-
scribed systems and methods that sought to keep visitors on the origi-
nal website after the visitors clicked a third party advertisement.173
Normally, clicking a third party advertisement would take the visitor
away to the third party’s site.174 In DDR Holdings, the described sys-
tem would host the third party merchant’s information but display it
in the host website with the host website’s look and feel.175 The claims
in question, rather than citing the use of a generic computer or use of
the Internet, “specif[ied] how interactions with the Internet [were]
manipulated to yield a desired result.”176 The Court cautioned that
patents solving Internet-centric problems were not all eligible for pat-
ents.177 The key, according to the Court, was that “the claims recite[d]
an invention that [was] not merely the routine or conventional use of
the Internet.”178
After subject matter, another concern for software may be the obvi-
ousness requirement. Courts test for obviousness using four factors:
“(1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) the level of ordinary
skill in the art; (3) the differences between the prior art and the
claimed invention; and (4) the extent of any objective indicia of non-
obviousness.”179 In a recent example of the obviousness test, the Fed-
168. Memorandum from Andrew Hirshfeld, Deputy Comm’r for Patent Examina-
tion Policy, United States Patent and Trademark Office, to Patent Examining Corps
(June 25, 2014) (on file with author).
169. Id. at 1.
170. Id. at 3.
171. Bart Eppenauer, DDR Holdings—Federal Circuit Forges a Sensible Path on
Software Patents, PATENTLY-O (Dec. 14, 2014), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2014/12/
holdings-sensible-software.html [http://perma.cc/TKJ4-JS9A].
172. DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, LP, 773 F.3d 1245, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
173. See id. at 1248.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 1248–49.
176. Id. at 1258.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1259.
179. Crocs, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 598 F.3d 1294, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
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eral Circuit Court of Appeals examined the Crocs shoe patent to de-
termine whether it was obvious at the time of invention.180
The court used two pieces of prior art (a term used to describe pre-
vious disclosures such as other patents, published papers, or other
things in the public domain181) describing other shoes that were simi-
lar to Crocs.182 The claim at issue described a foam strap used to keep
the shoe on that both of the previous patents had described as inferior
and unsuitable.183 The court resolved the first three factors quickly—a
practitioner with ordinary skill in the art would avoid using the foam
straps because previous inventions had shown how inferior they were
to other designs, while this patent showed an effective way to use the
straps.184 But as the court pointed out, something does not become
patentable because the prior art labeled it inferior.185 The claim re-
sulted in something that the ordinary art did not predict.186 The sheer
commercial success of Crocs was a clear indicia of non-obviousness
and so great that not much other secondary consideration was
needed.187 All four weighed together pushed the Crocs patent beyond
some obvious improvement.188
B. Ordinary Software’s Rights & Limitations Under a Patent
In some ways, the rights and limitations for patented software are
more straightforward than copyrighted software. Once software gains
a patent, the inventor or patent assignee hold “negative” rights similar
to copyrights. The holder of the patent has the right to exclude others
“from making, using, . . . or selling the invention throughout the
United States.”189 This is commonly referred to as a patent monop-
oly,190 and it generally lasts for twenty years.191 The trade-off is that at
the end of those twenty years, the invention goes into the public do-
main and can be used by anyone.192
180. Id. at 1297.
181. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).
182. Crocs, 598 F.3d at 1308.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 1309–10.
185. Id. at 1308.
186. Id. at 1310.
187. Id. at 1310–11.
188. Id. at 1311.
189. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2012).
190. See United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 485 (1926) (“But under the
patent law the patentee is given by statute a monopoly of making, using and selling
the patented article. The extent of his monopoly in the articles sold and in the terri-
tory of the United States where sold is not limited in the grant of his patent . . . .”).
191. § 154(a)(2).
192. Warden v. City of St. Louis, Mo., 140 F.2d 615, 617 (8th Cir. 1944) (“It must
necessarily follow that when that monopoly ceases, the invention, for any and all pur-
poses for which it is adapted, becomes public property and can be used by any one.”).
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An invention’s claims limit the scope of a patent.193 Unless the pat-
entee creates his or her own definitions in the patent, “the words of a
claim are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning as
understood by a person of ordinary skill in the art when read in the
context of the specification and prosecution history.”194 For example,
one of the terms at issue in In re Papst was the phrase “virtual
files.”195 The patent in question had described a host-native driver
that could obtain access to data that was not actually on a device for
which the drive was designed.196 Papst and the camera manufacturers
disagreed on where the data in the virtual files was coming from.197
Papst claimed the data could be derived from the interface device,
while the camera manufacturers wanted to limit it to the data device
connected to the host.198 Looking at the claim construction, the court
agreed with Papst, stating that nothing in the claims or description had
limited the virtual file to data stored on the interface device.199 The
word “virtual” was undefined in the patent itself, but the court looked
to how “virtual” had been used in the computer field to come to their
conclusion.200 Defining the term was key to determining whether the
computer manufacturers had infringed on Papst’s patents.201 Infringe-
ment happens when the accused device contains every claim limitation
or its equivalent.202 In order to make that determination, a clear un-
derstanding of what the claim means is needed in the first place.203
C. Patent Rule Application to the ZeuS Family
It is hard to pinpoint the first rootkit. Rather, it is easier to pinpoint
the first time a rootkit was expanded to a different feature—the first
BIOS rootkit in 2011,204 the first industrial espionage rootkit in
2010,205 and the first Mac rootkit in 2009.206 Rootkits are still very
much a novel field of innovation and highly complex pieces of
193. Thorner v. Sony Comput. Entm’t Am., LLC, 669 F.3d 1362, 1367 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (“It is the claims that define the metes and bounds of the patentee’s
invention.”).
194. Id. at 1365.
195. In re Papst Licensing Dig. Camera Patent Litig., No. 2014-1110, 778 F.3d 1255,
1267 (Fed. Cir. 2015).






202. Id. at 1261.
203. Id.
204. Marco Guiliani, Mebromi: The First BIOS Rootkit in the Wild, WEBROOT
(Sept. 13, 2011), http://www.webroot.com/blog/2011/09/13/mebromi-the-first-bios-
rootkit-in-the-wild/ [http://perma.cc/NZE7-5JLV].
205. Nicolas Falliere, Stuxnet Introduces the First Known Rootkit for Industrial
Control Systems, SYMANTEC (Aug. 6, 2010), http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/
stuxnet-introduces-first-known-rootkit-scada-devices [http://perma.cc/T3V5-9GF8].
2016] ALL YOUR IP ARE BELONG TO US 685
software. Rootkits manipulate the computers they run on (whether
generic or special) in order to conceal their presence, maintain their
hold, and transfer their payload.207 Similar to the DDR Holdings pat-
ents, claims for a rootkit would involve situations unique to the com-
puter. A rootkit patent could describe manipulating features of the
computer to achieve its desired results such as injecting itself in the
existing kernel to intercept processes or overwriting with a new kernel
mode driver. ZeuS, however, would have been a barrier to future
rootkits gaining a patent. The success and wide availability of the
ZeuS family of rootkits creates extensive prior art. ZeuS pioneered a
means of modularizing the rootkit and building it into a malware kit
that anyone could use to create one. While ZeuS may have been pat-
entable, a future patent for Ice IX would have been very narrow in
scope if patentable at all.
A botnet may actually fall into Alice’s trap of a computer becoming
something long prevalent and traditional. Botnets have been around
since the first ill-fated Cornell experiment (dubbed the “Morris
Worm”) in 1988.208 Computer science student Robert Morris wanted
to create “a network of thousands of computers coordinating with one
another and available to carry out further instructions at the direction
of their master.”209 This is what we would later call a botnet. Since
1988, botnets have become increasingly common and all function in a
similar way—zombie hosts communicate with a C&C awaiting instruc-
tions for where to put their computing power to use. Botnets would
certainly pose a problem with anticipation via prior art (consider, for
example, open source projects such as BOINC, whose code is freely
downloadable).
While the botnet portion of ZeuS may not be patentable post-Alice,
the rootkit portion could be. In a patent, the art is disclosed in ex-
change for the patent-holder’s monopoly. The fact that Ice IX built its
rootkit largely modeled on the ZeuS code base after it was leaked
would not be the major issue. Ice IX instead would need to worry
about infringement based on whether its product practices all of
ZeuS’s claims or some equivalent. SpyEye might not be an infringer.
Slavik transferred the code to Gribodemon. While Gribodemon’s
original invention removed ZeuS, it was not clear that it was originally
based on the ZeuS codebase.
206. See Thomas Claburn, Black Hat: Mac OS X Rootkit Debuts, INFO. WEEK (July
30, 2009, 4:59 PM), http://www.darkreading.com/vulnerabilities-and-threats/black-hat-
mac-os-x-rootkit-debuts/d/d-id/1081846 [http://perma.cc/7SJV-BQE7].
207. BLUNDEN, supra note 29, at 49.
208. Timothy B. Lee, How a Grad Student Trying to Build the First Botnet Brought
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V. CONCLUSION: WHO AND WHAT ARE WE PROTECTING?
The ZeuS family of rootkits arguably has copyrightable and patent-
able elements. But the question remains as to why we would even
want to extend intellectual property protection to malware—after all,
who and what are we protecting? The discussion will continue to as-
sume that the rootkits were developed in the U.S. as international is-
sues exceed the scope of this Comment.
A. Protecting Innovation and Creation
The overriding purpose of patent law is to protect innovation, while
copyright law seeks to protect creation.210 The rights of our innovators
and creators are so core to American culture and economy that they
can be found rooted soundly in the U.S. Constitution.211 Malware, de-
spite its dubious nature, has steadily evolved in its technology212 and
has provided valuable research and development. Consider again
Creeper and Reaper, the first self-replicating programs and the pre-
cursors to the modern-day virus.213
While self-replication is an element of identifying viruses, self-repli-
cation also has other uses.214 Bob Thomas at BBN pioneered a tech-
nology later used in a wide range of modern applications. For
example, self-replication is key in biocomputing and bioinformatics.215
Self-replication in programming code can be used to mimic the chemi-
cal processes in DNA and to map artificial chemical computing
models.216
Computer scientists have also proposed “good” uses for malware.
John Aycock and Alana Maurushat proposed what they dubbed the
“Human Rights Worm” to test the extent of Internet censorship in
other countries without putting human rights activists at risk.217 The
worm was not created and was instead more of a thought experiment
in the issues that “good” malware might face.218 The Human Rights
210. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
211. See id.; see also Statement by President Barack Obama Upon Signing H.R.
1249, 2011 U.S.C.C.A.N. S6, S6 (“Here in America, our creativity has always set us
apart, and in order to continue to grow our economy, we need to encourage that spirit
wherever we find it.”).
212. See Adam Kujawa, Criminal Innovation in Malware Leaves Antivirus Industry
Flagging, WIRED (Oct. 2, 2012), http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2012-10/02/
malware-evolution [http://perma.cc/M4Z7-TRS3].
213. Schantz, supra note 1, at 74; First Computer Virus, supra note 3; Shoch &
Hupp, supra note 4, at 179.
214. What Is a Computer Virus?, supra note 5.
215. Lidia Yamamoto et al., Self-Replicating and Self-Modifying Programs in
Fraglets, 2007 PROCEEDINGS BIO-INSPIRED MODELS NETWORK, INFO., & COMPUTING
SYSTEMS 159, 159.
216. Id. at 160.
217. John Aycock & Alana Maurushat, “Good” Worms and Human Rights, 38
ACM SIGCAS COMPUTERS & SOC’Y 28, 30–31 (2008).
218. Id. at 31.
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Worm has all of the indicia of malware based on our previous defini-
tions.219 However, the Human Rights Worm also has the marks of
something that could have been patentable when it was proposed in
2008. The invention was certainly useful and novel—Aycock and
Maurushat proposed using malware for testing censorship.220 While
the software took an existing abstract idea of the malicious worm,
claims could have been constructed around the improvements they
suggested that showed an inventive concept beyond the average
worm.221 Aycock and Maurushat proposed malware that improved on
the existing worm, malicious or otherwise.222
The Human Rights Worm is only one example of the innovation
outside the criminal ZeuS family of rootkits. The Welchia worm came
in the early 2000s seeking to spread across the Internet and patch the
vulnerabilities it found.223 In the end, Welchia was not successful and
caused other problems.224 But it too had an inventive concept that
rose above whatever prior art may have existed for Internet worms.225
Both the Human Rights Worm and Welchia should have been copy-
rightable as well. Each of these worms embodies different expressions
of the same idea—malware that spreads for the good of the Internet.
B. Should Illegality or Immorality Matter?
In intellectual property, trademark law is notoriously able to deny a
mark based on a scandalous or immoral nature.226 For a period of
time, there was a morality framework in copyrights and patents. In
copyrights, the federal courts let go of the morality bar first in the
Fifth Circuit in 1979227 and in the Ninth Circuit in 1982.228 In Mitchell
Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, the court determined that
Congress had purposefully extended copyright protection to all crea-
tive works regardless of subject matter.229 As a practical matter, the
Mitchell Bros. court also did not see how an obscenity or immorality
standard could work in copyrights long term, since society’s views
change and would also effectively “fragment copyright enforcement,
219. See id.; What Is a Computer Virus?, supra note 5.
220. Aycock & Maurushat, supra note 217, at 30–31.
221. Id. at 31, 33–34.
222. Id. at 37.
223. See GENE BRANSFIELD, THE WELCHIA WORM 1, 3 (GCIH Practical Series
Vol. 3, 2003), http://www.giac.org/paper/gcih/517/welchia-worm/105720 [http://perma
.cc/W3CR-NB6V].
224. See id. at 27.
225. See id. at 3–23.
226. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (2012).
227. Mitchell Bros. Film Grp. v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 861–62 (5th
Cir. 1979)
228. Jartech, Inc. v. Clancy, 666 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1982).
229. See Mitchell Bros., 604 F.2d at 855.
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protecting registered materials in a certain community, while, in ef-
fect, authorizing pirating in another locale.”230
Patents also once had a “moral utility doctrine” that was effectively
overruled due to society’s changing views.231 The moral utility doc-
trine came from Justice Story’s formulation of useful: something that
could not conflict with the sound morals of society.232 Today, most
would say morality has no place in American patent law, though its
specter—and Justice Story’s interpretation of it—appears in narrow
applications such as patenting genetics.233
Some scholarship indicates that the beginnings of a morality frame-
work are at least appearing in patents. Since the early 2000s, patents
in biotechnology have been increasingly controversial.234 While inter-
national patents were out of scope for this paper, it is important to
note that there are bars internationally to patents involving human
genetics.235 During the Supreme Court’s review of the patenting of the
BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes in Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myr-
iad Genetics, Inc., the parties made arguments for and against patent-
ing that closely resemble this Comment’s propositions.236 On the one
hand, proponents wanted to protect innovation.237 On the other, op-
ponents pointed not only to the law of nature bar in U.S. patent law238
but also to something intrinsically immoral in patenting human genet-
ics.239 That same intrinsic implication of something immoral perme-
ates the world of malware. Ultimately, the Supreme Court precluded
patenting of naturally occurring DNA by applying the law of nature
bar; conversely, synthetically created DNA could be patented.240 The
Court did not rely on morality judgment—only on an application of
patent law. The same should be true of malware.
Another argument against patenting human genes also applies to
malware: opponents argued that patents could cause monopolies that
inhibit access to medication and treatment.241 This is analogous to
230. Jartech, 666 F.2d at 406.
231. See Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1366–67 (Fed. Cir.
1999).
232. Benjamin D. Enerson, Note, Protecting Society from Patently Offensive Inven-
tions: The Risk of Reviving the Moral Utility Doctrine, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 685, 690
(2004) (citing Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (C.C. Mass. 1817) (No. 8568)).
233. Id. at 692–94.
234. Darryl R. J. Macer, Inventions, Patents, and Morality, in BIOTECHNOLOGY, EN-
CYCLOPEDIA LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEMS (Horst W. Doelle et al. eds., 2001).
235. Id.
236. See T.C., Why Are Gene Patents Controversial?, ECONOMIST (Apr. 18, 2013,
11:50 PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/04/economist-
explains-why-gene-patents-controversial [http://perma.cc/R4N7-JFFH] (discussing
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013)).
237. Id.
238. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012); Le Roy v. Tatham, 63 U.S. 132 (1859).
239. T.C., supra note 236.
240. Myriad, 133 S. Ct. at 2116, 2119–20.
241. See Macer, supra note 234.
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malware, in that patents could cause monopolies on security vulnera-
bilities and limit how the cybersecurity industry protects against these
issues. This outcome is unlikely if patent law treats security vulnerabil-
ity as an abstract idea. How the vulnerability is applied should be what
shows the “something more” required for post-Alice software patents.
CFAA penalizes access and conspiracy to access without authoriza-
tion242 which can be achieved through using malware. It does not, and
should not, penalize authoring malware. If writing malware is wrong,
then it should be clear that it is wrong. But as it stands today, malware
is innovation and is protectable under patent just as it is a creative
work protectable under copyright.
C. White Hats vs. Black Hats
As previously discussed, CFAA appears to have a chilling effect on
both the researchers (the White Hats) and the criminals (the Black
Hats).243 Whether or not some action falls under CFAA does not take
into account the author’s intent and certainly pays no heed to whether
the malware had intellectual property rights.244 This Comment does
not propose altering CFAA in a manner that would give deference to
those rights. It does propose continuing to allow intellectual property
rights to protect the work.
Cybercriminals are unlikely to seek protection for their work. Like
the Slashdot user joked, such criminal activity is more likely to use an
equally criminal means of enforcement.245 Furthermore, a patent
would disclose the criminal’s method of operation. The criminal activ-
ity of unauthorized access to computing resources should be pun-
ished.246 But the law should be able to recognize that writing malware
is not the same as using malware and that the innovation and cre-
ations from both White and Black Hats still deserve protection. Pun-
ish the person who uses malware for unauthorized access to a
system—but protect the work as an addition to our body of technolog-
ical innovation.
242. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)–(b) (2012).
243. See supra Section II.C.
244. See § 1030(a)–(b).
245. Kdawson, supra note 18.
246. See § 1030(c).
